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McKELVEY ON EVIDENCE-A REVIEW
VICTOR S. KILKENNYt

THERE is an old saying that "the test of ability is a record of achievement." McKelvey's record shows that during the past 50 years he
has written five editions of a hand-book on the Law of Evidence, all of
which have been excellent and outstanding contributions to a better
understanding of this difficult legal subject. His remarkable achievement is now further emphasized by the appearance late last year of his
latest edition,' at a time which almost marks the "golden anniversary"
of his first edition.2 As the actor's success upon the stage is popularly
reflected in the repeated encores which greet his splendid performances,
so McKelvey's talented efforts, over the past 50 years, have won the
deserved encores and plaudits of a grateful legal world; and the appearance at quite regular intervals of each new edition gives further evidence, in and by itself, of the honor due the author, for his work so
well done. We know of no better way of paying tribute to McKelvey
at this time than by a review of his latest accomplishment. This treatise
on the Law of Evidence has long since found its place in the Hornbook
Series,--a series of treatises on all of the principal subjects of the law,
written by outstanding legal authorities and enjoyed by countless thousands of students of the law, throughout the nation.
The preface is a model of humility and respectful appreciation of
the author's preceptors. He prides himself in the opportunity enjoyed
at Harvard Law School, under the teachings of Langdell, Ames, Gray
and Thayer. He particularly refers to James B. Thayer, who was then
at the apex of his brilliant teaching career, and whose favorite subject
was Evidence. He gives Thayer credit for any merit in the work and
for the insight obtained and the active interest aroused as a result of
personal contact with that eminent teacher- "in classes then so small
that they were more a series of round table discussions than formal
lectures." 3 The author confesses that he "has endeavored to transmit
the understanding of the subject originally gained under Thayer's
teaching, supplemented by succeeding observation, study and experience in the practical application of the rules of evidence for more than
half a century, to those who today are beginning 4 a career in a field
in which the author's career is drawing to a close."
tInstructor in Law, Fordham University School of Law.
Book Review of McKELvEy oN EVIDENCE. By John Jay McKelvey. (Fifth Edition). St.
Paul: West Publishing Company. 1944. pp. xxiv, 814. $5.00. Unless otherwise specified,
page and chapter references in footnotes will refer to this text.
1. The fifth.
2. The first edition was published in 1897.
3. P. v.
4. P. vi.
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In the preface to the first edition the author wrote, "The present
treatise is the embodiment of an attempt to restate the principles of
the law of evidence in a manner easy of comprehension by the student
and for the practitioner easy of application." ' That sentence also describes the purpose and the attainment of the fifth edition.
McKelvey recognizes the swing of the pendulum of sentiment through
the years, from the too rigid application of the old rules to the modern
extreme of liberality in the desire to get rid of rules. As he correctly
points out, "the traveler is quite as likely to be lost in a maze of uncertainty by too many signs as he is to be left in doubt by too few." 6
He suggests as a remedy, "That a wider discretion should be allowed
to the trial judge ...

for the rules are to be regarded as a part of the

machinery for ascertaining the real facts, and not as barriers to their
disclosure."'
He points out that "Wigmore performed a gargantuan task in assembling, considering, classifying, discussing and recording the thousands
upon thousands of decisions which poured in-a never ceasing and steadily increasing stream from the appellate courts.", Wigmore's ten-volume
treatise on the Law of Evidence testifies to his herculean task, and yet
it has been aptly remarked, "Any thoughtful lawyer who will merely
thumb the pages of Wigmore will be convinced that the existing law of
evidence is in hopeless confusion." 9
The author frankly admits that his purpose is "to treat the law as it
is, not as it ought to be or as it perchance may be in the future."' He
seeks "to trace the rules to their source, so that a clearer conception
of their purpose might be gained and thus promote a more understanding application in the trial of cases."" And then he continues, "In the
preparation of this fifth edition, the changes in the treatment of the
various topics discussed hdve been with a view to greater clearness and
more orderly arrangement. Recent citations will be found and earlier
ones, in some cases, omitted."' 2 In these respects, he has generally succeeded.
The most significant change is the addition of a new, separate chapter
dealing with Pictorial Evidence. As McKelvey explains, "This subject
had a minor place in the chapter on Writings in previous editions, but
5. P. vi.
6. P. vi.

7

P. Vi.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

P. vii.
P. viii.
P. x.
P. ix.
P. x.
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has attained so important a role in trials that it is deserving of greater
13
attention on the part of the student as well as the practitioner."'
A glance at the Table of Contents reveals that McKelvey follows
the customary order in the treatment of the subject matter, and this
summary review will follow the same sequence. A Table of Cases at
the end of the book lists approximately 5000 cases cited, and by itself
indicates the tremendous work wliich has been compressed in this single volume. Copious footnotes supplement the text and set forth numerous authorities. A clear index with reference to pages completes the
book. A further aid to the reader in locating particular subject matter
quickly is accomplished by sub-dividing each main chapter heading into
clearly expressed sub-heads, each of which is set forth in bold type for
ready reference, with a detailed discussion beneath.
The style throughout is simple, direct and clear, free from unnecessary verbiage and confusion. For example, the introductory chapter 4
establishes the place of evidence in the law, defines and distinguishes
"evidence" and the "law of evidence," points out the origin of the law
of evidence, stresses the fact that justice will make elastic the rules,
emphasizes the functions of the court on the trial in determining the
admissibility of evidence, and concludes that the law of evidence is concerned chiefly with deciding what are evidentiary facts. The pleadings
and the admissions of the parties will determine what facts are in
issue. Then at the trial, the rules of evidence are applied. And these
rules, which sometimes become very complex and troublesome, all stem
from two basic rules. The first basic rule is founded upon logic and
common sense, namely, whatever is irrelevant is inadmissible. Naturally, if the proof offered to establish the facts in issue is not logically probative thereof, it is irrelevant and inadniissible. The second
basic rule is really a corollary of the first, and it provides that whatever
is relevant or logically probative of the facts in issue is admissible, unless it is excluded by some law or rule of evidence. Thus a study of the
Law of Evidence is a study of these exclusionary rules. Our jury system
is chiefly responsible for the existence of these exclusionary rules.
Many relevant facts are kept out of evidence simply because the law
fears that more harm than good will result from a knowledge of those
facts by jurors.
From this simple but complete introduction, the author proceeds naturally to the chapter dealing with "Judicial Notice."' 15 Facts, which are
admitted by the formal pleadings or by stipulation of the parties are
not in issue and need not be proved by evidence at the trial. Likewise,
13. P. x.
14.
15.

Chap. 1.
Chap. 2.
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there are many facts of such common knowledge that the law will require no formal proof of those facts. What people generally know will
be "judicially noticed" by the courts. Thus McKelvey writes of this
doctrine, "It has to do with evidence, in a negative sense, in that it
teaches when evidence need not be given. It is not always necessary
to prove every fact which goes towards the making up of a case. The
fact may be of such a nature that the court either cannot or will not
require any proof."' 6 From that plain observation, McKelvey develops
the subject of Judicial Notice by a consideration of numerous illustrations in which the principle has been applied.
Critical comment is here made of the author's discussion of the question of the judicial notice by the courts of one State of the statutes of
another State or foreign jurisdiction.' 7 Thus he states in a footnote, 8
"In New Jersey, the law of a sister state at a given time is a 'question
of fact' which must be ascertained by competent proof .

. .

. Also in

New York, the question of what is the law of the foreign jurisdiction
is one of fact, and such law must be proved as facts are proven." 9 The
author fails to note or mention that under existing New Jersey statutory
law, 20 "Whenever the common or statute law of any State, territory or
other jurisdiction of the United States, is pleaded in an action in any
court of this State, the court shall take judicial notice thereof." Likewise, he fails to note or mention that under a new New York statute,'
effective September 1, 1943, an important change has been made in
New York, greatly increasing the discretionary power of both trial and
appellate courts in that State to take judicial notice of the laws, statutes, proclamations, edits, decrees, ordinances, unwritten or common
law of a sister state, a territory or other jurisdiction of the United States,
or of a foreign country or political subdivision thereof. This far-reaching
New York statute2 2 allows New York courts also to notice judicially
private acts and resolutions of the state legislature and of Congress, as
well as municipal ordinances and resolutions, and even the rules
and regulations of public boards and agencies of the State, municipalities thereof, and of the United States. Therefore, the text must be read
in the light of new statutes and decisions, which may declare a contrary
result in a particular jurisdiction.
The chapter dealing with "Questions of Law and Questions of Fact"
16.

P. 22.

17. P. 45.
18. P. 46, n. 51. Italics added.
19. Citing Read v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 284 N. Y. 435, 31 N. E. (2d) 891 (1940).
20. N. J. Laws 1942, c. 104, N. J. S. A. 2:98-28.
21. N. Y. Laws 1943, ch. 536, N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 344a.
22. Ibid.
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is written with a clarity that makes this troublesome problem easy of
comprehension. 3 Many questions arise during the course of the trial
which require the determination of the trial judge. Other questions must
be left for solution by the jury. Particularly important is the author's
stress upon the fallacy that all questions of law are for the court and
all questions of fact are for the jury. His numerous illustrations of the
court's function in passing upon questions of fact as a preliminary to
their admission in evidence are most helpful and go a long way in dissipating the illusion that fact questions are always for the jury. Again,.
the footnote cases explanatory of what constitutes matter of fact and
matter of law in negligence actions are well chosen.
In discussing the "burden of proof, 2 *1 which must be sustained at the
trial by the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue, true emphasis
is placed upon the distinction between this burden of proof, which is
determined by the pleadings and never shifts during the 'progress of
the trial, and the "burden of proceeding or going forward," which
often shifts from one party to the other during the trialY Likewise, the
author clearly points out the true relation between a "prima facie" case
and the burden of proof, in that the establishing of a "prima facie"
case has no effect upon the ultimate burden of proof, though it shifts
from the shoulders of him who has made it the burden of proceeding.
And then, the elementary difference between the quantity and the quality
of the evidence is similarly stressed, for "our system has -never determined a case merely upon number of witnesses." 26 Of course, the number of witnesses may become important, where other things are equal
or where there is an express provision of law, as in treason cases, in
which the testimony of two witnesses becomes necessary.
.The subject of "Presumptions" 2 7 is very comprehensively treated.
Presumptions "as inferences" are clearly contrasted with presumptions
"as rules of law." Then there is the distinction between "prima facie"
presumptions, which may be rebutted by contradictory evidence, as in
the case of an unexplained absence of seven years or more,28 and the
absolute or conclusive presumptions, which are hard and fast rules of
law, as in the case of the age-old common law presumption that one
under the age of seven years is conclusively presumed incapable of committing a crime.'
23.
24.

Chap. 3.
Chap. 4.

25.
26.

P. 101.
P. 109.

27. Chap. 5.
28. P. 127.
29. P. 144, N. Y. PENAL LAW § 816.
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This matter of presumptions is subdivided, so as to include separate
discussion of the principal presumptions, such as death after seven
years absence, the legitimacy of children, the receipt of letters properly
addressed and mailed, the capacity to commit crime, knowledge of the
law, survivorship at common law in common disasters, innocence in
criminal cases, legality, regularity, and the like. There is also a subdivision concerned with the legal doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
is often referred to erroneously as a presumption. When a case falls
within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it simply means that from the
facts presented the jury may find negligence, but they are not required
by any rule or presumption to find a party negligent. McKelvey treats
extensively of what he calls "spurious" presumptions, which are not
true presumptions in a legal sense, but rather "merely modes of expressing certain applications of the principles of the subject of judicial notice, or are statements of certain general principles and maxims in the
law, having nothing to do with evidence or inference."3 In this group,
he includes the presumptions of sanity, intent as to the natural and
probable consequences of one's acts, the laws of other jurisdictions,
legality, regularity, innocence and many others. The classifying of presumptions as true or spurious adds nothing of value to a knowledge of
the subject, and may on the contrary lead to confusion and misunderstanding. If in the trial of an action the matter will be presumed, either
prima facie or conclusively, what can be gained by labelling the
presumption involved real or spurious? It is not like the author's able
treatment of the so-called "conflicting" presumptions or inferences, from
which we can gain the valuable rule of evidence to the effect that in
the case of conflicting presumptions, the stronger will prevail. 3' For
example, if there is a conflict between the presumption of innocence
and the presumption of continuity, the former is regarded in the law
as the stronger and will therefore outweigh the latter.
The chapter on "Admissions"3 2 is simply, yet well covered. Formal
admissions, which may be made by a party in his pleading, or by stipulation before trial, or by statement in 'open court, are compared with
what the author calls "evidential" admissions, described by him as a
"statement by a party (at some previous time) of a fact inconsistent
'
with a fact attempted to be established by him at the time of trial."
The use of the descriptive word "evidential" is hardly desirable. It is
not well chosen as a contrast to "formal," since all relevant admissions
30.
31.
32.
33.

P. 145.
P. 171.
Chap. 6.
P. 175.
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are generally evidential. Would not the word "informal" or "extra judicial," or, as some put it, "unsolemn" be preferable? Further, the definition of an evidential admission as a "statement" is not broad enough,
since there may be implied admissions and admissions by conduct, as
well as statement, as the author himelf subsequently points out in this
chapter, in his discussion of "indirect admissions." 3 Thus, it is a well
known rule that evidence of silence in the face of an accusation is admissible, as an admission by conduct, even though the party against
whom it is used made no statement.
In logical sequence follows a chapter on "Confessions" as admissions
of guilt made by persons accused of crime." McKelvey always tries to
state the prevailing rule of evidence. Thus we read, "Confessions to be
admissible in evidence must be voluntary; if made as the result of
threats or inducements, they are inadmissible."3 This is a good statement of the common law rule"I and of the prevailing opinion, but one
must be warned that it may not be the precise rule of a particular jurisdiction. Of course, the author frequently sets forth the views of other
jurisdictions in footnote references. Thus, in New York, we note that
a confession is "voluntary," unless made under the influence of fear
produced by threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the District
Attorney not to prosecute."' Therefore, it is not every inducement in
New York which renders the confession involuntary, but only the stipulation of the District Attorney that the accused shall not be prosecuted.
Again, the author in limited space cannot point out the particular rules
of every state, for example, the sharp distinction in New York between
the duty of a magistrate to inform the accused of his legal rights and
the absence of any such duty on the part of an arresting officer or the
District Attorney to warn the accused that any statement he may make
may be used against him. 9 But otherwise the text is comprehensive and
includes even consideration of the legal effect of confession made under
the influence of liquor.4
McKelvey makes justifiable criticism of a harsh New York rule,
which allows an accused, to withdraw a plea of guilty, with the court's
permission, and then in a subsequent trial on the merits permits evidence to be introduced to show that the accused previously pleaded
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
N. Y.
40.

P. 181.
Chap. 7, p. 221.
P. 224.
P. 231.
N. Y. CODE Cam . PROC. § 395.
People v. Ferola, 215 N. Y. 285, 109 N. E. 500 (1915); People v. Mondon, 103
211, 8 N. E. 496 (1886).
P. 235.
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guilty to the crime.4 As Lehman, J. pointed out in the dissenting opinion
in a New York case, "When the State allows a man a trial, the trial
should be fair; when the court decides that in the interest of justice
a plea may be withdrawn, because there would be possible danger of
injustice in acting upon it, the accused should be placed in the same
position as if the plea had never been made."
"A confession alone is insufficient to prove the crime charged. Corroborating evidence is required."42 This statement by the author naturally
leads to a consideration of the necessity of establishing the "corpus
delicti." For as he says, "The corroborating evidence must be sufficient
to establish prima facie, at least, the corpus delicti, which is defined as consisting of the act and of the criminal agency of the act, irrespective of its connection with the accused."43 Particular note is made
of the difficulty found in a New York case,44 involving a felony murder,
in applying these inter-related rules dealing with confessions and the
corpus delicti. In that instance, the defendant confessed the homicide
and that he was at the time committing robbery. But there was no other
proof as to the robbery, except the confession. The New York statute
declares that a confession is insufficient to warrant a conviction "without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed." 4
Corroboration, therefore, as to the homicide, without similar corroboration as to the felony, robbery, was held to be sufficient. This holding
is contrary to an earlier New York case involving the same legal question.4 6
The admissibility of evidence obtained as the result of an excluded
confession, and the admissibility, in the State courts, of evidence wrongfully obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure, are both
considered in this chapter on confessions. 47 The distinctive, contrary rule
in the Federal courts, as to evidence resulting from an unlawful search
and seizure, is stressed. It is regrettable that there should exist such an
obvious lack of harmony, between the Federal and the State tribunals,
on this basic point.
McKelvey's discussion of "confessions of third parties

'4

isreassur-

ing. The theatre and the motion pictures have often dramatized the
41. P. 237, Kercheval v. U. S. 274 U. S. 220 (1927); People v. Steinmetz, 240 N. Y.
411, 148 N. E. 597 (1925).
42. P. 238.
43. P. 239.
44. People v. Lytton, 257 N. Y. 310, 178 N. E. 290 (1931).
45. N. Y. CODE CRnX. PROC. § 395.
46. People v. Joyce, 233 N. Y. 61, 134 N. E. 836 (1922).
47. Pp. 241, 243.
48. P. 246.
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scene, wherein the innocent man on trial is saved at the last minute
by the "confession," perhaps of the death-bed variety, of some third
person not on trial. But as a matter of technical law, these death-bed
confessions have not been and are not now admissible in evidence to
prove the innocence of the defendant on trial. They are not admissible
as dying declarations, because they are not made by a victim naming
his assailant or the circumstances of the fatal attack upon him.' Nor
are they admissible as declarations against interest, because they are
merely against the "penal" interest, and not against the "pecuniary or
proprietary" interest, as required by the rules of evidence. McKelvey
strongly criticizes the law, which excludes these confessions. Thus he
quotes from Mr. Justice Holmes, ". . . no other statement is so much
against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated
to convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a
man.; 49 And he sums up his criticism in these words, "Reluctance to
leave the hallowed precincts of precedent for the free open fields of
common sense and common humanity. Unwillingness to be first to depart from a course conceded to be wrong"'O There seems to be no good
reason, except technical rules of evidence, why a person accused of
crime should not have the benefit of such a confession by another as
a piece of circumstantial evidence.
The chapter on "Relevancy"" contains all of the well known rules
for the exclusion of relevant testimony, because of its immateriality, or
its unfair tendency in the particular case to create undue confusion,
delay, surprise or prejudice. Included here is the rule which provides
that the quality of an insensate object, at a time in issue, may be evidenced by other manifestations of its quality at other times, under
similar conditions. But human conduct is not so uniform and therefore
the quality of human conduct at a time in issue- may not be proved by
showing how a person acted on some other occasion. There is the qualifying rule, known as res inter alios acta, in which other instances of
human conduct are admissible to prove notice, knowledge, intent, motive, identity or a common scheme.
The peculiarity of the New York rule as to the admissibility in condemnation proceedings in New York City (but not in New York State
generally) of other sales of comparable real estate to prove value is
indicated and a footnote, sets forth fully the statutory provision as to
trial procedure. 2 Again, the inadmissibility of subsequent acts of pre49.
50.
51.

Donnelly v. U. S., 228 U. S. 243, 278 (1913).
P. 247.
Chap. 8.

52.

P. 263; In re Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463, 28 N. E. 389 (1891); N. Y. C., AD=Ir.

CODE § B-15-16.0.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[VCol. 14

caution to show previous negligence is stressed. In brief, this chapter
is replete with numerous examples, and where the rule stated is not
universally followed the author in an annotation takes pains to point
it out as in the New Jersey case in which the law of that State is
sharply at variance with the law of New York, on the elementary question of whether or not evidence is admissible to show that thousands
of other persons used the
common passageway, where plaintiff fell,
3
without harmful results.5

The rules of evidence with reference to "character" evidence in the
trial of criminal and civil actions are succinctly set forth." Starting
with the basic rule that the character of a person may not generally
be shown for the purpose of proving his conduct, McKelvey states the
rule in criminal cases. The accused may prove such traits of character
as tend to make it improbable that he would or could have committed
the crime charged. But the prosecution may not introduce evidence as
to the bad character of the accused, unless the accused first opens the
door by offering evidence as to his good character. Of course, in actions
such as libel and slander, where character itself is a fact in issue, evidence to prove that it is good or bad is admissible. The distinction
between "character," what a man is, and "reputation," what people suppose him to be, is pointed out. Likewise, we note the anomaly in the
law which prohibits proof of a person's character, except by proof of
his reputation, even though we know that one may have a good character and a bad reputation, and vice versa. The very acts which evidence
good or bad character may not be testified to, nor may the witness state
his opinion of the person's character. He is limited to telling what others
think and say, or negatively that he heard nothing against his character. The character of a witness for veracity may always be shown to
affect his credibility. Also, the criminal record of a witness may be
used against him, to affect his credibility. This use of the criminal
record is an outgrowth of the common law rule which disqualified a
person convicted of crime from being a witness. That old rule has long
since been abandoned, but the new rule is firmly fixed. Is it just, sound
or logical to allow use of a criminal record to affect credibility? Does
not the present rule, under the guise of testing credibility, cause injustice and prejudicial inferences? Finally in this chapter, special rules
applicable to rape and other sexual crimes are noted as su generis.
"Opinion" evidence, both lay and expert, is fully treated 5 The
53.
56 N.
54.
55.

Temperance Hall v. Giles, 33 N. J. L. 260; Crocheron v. North Shore Ferry Co.,
Y. 566 (1874).
Chap. 9.
Chap. 10.
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primary difficulty of distinguishing legally between "matter of fact" and
"matter of opinion" is simplified by the use of numerous examples. The
basic reasons for the allowance of opinion evidence are first, aid to the
jury, and secondly, difficulty on the part of the witness in otherwise
testifying. If the opinion will not aid the jury, then the opinion is not
admissible, whether given by an expert or a lay witness. The distinction
between expert and non-expert opinion evidence is important. Where
the non-expert renders an opinion, it must be based upon facts observed
by him. It cannot be based upon the so-called hypothetical question.
The expert on the other hand may give an opinion, based upon admitted
facts, or facts already testified to by other witnesses at the trial, which
facts may not have been personally observed by the expert. Of course,
one may be "expert," without necessarily being a "professional."
But before an expert may render an opinion, as such, he must be
duly qualified. Special attention is given by the author to those types
of cases in which opinion testimony is most frequently resorted to,
namely, in handwriting (including typewriting) disputes, in cases involving one's sanity and in matters relating to foreign law. As to the
last mentioned, McKelvey briefly states, "What the foreign law is on
any particular subject is a question of fact. Yet it is beyond the knowledge of the average person. ' " The qualification of one to testify as an
expert is a preliminary matter to be determined by the court. The weight
to be given to the expert's testimony is for the jury. Likewise, the question of damages is for the jury to determine and is not properly the
subject of expert testimony, although experts may testify to the value
of the article before and its value after the alleged happening, leaving
it to the jury to subtract the difference to determine damage.
McKelvey points out the use of opinion testimony by non-experts
as well as experts in sanity cases. 7 The footnotes, however, stress the
special rule in New York, in the case of the non-expert, wherein generally he is limited to testifying to facts observed and then the "impressions" made by those facts upon his mind, as to whether the person in
question was "rational" or not.5" The general rule throughout the country 9 allowing the non-expert to state his opinion as to sanity upon facts
personally observed seems much more desirable than the limited, technical New York rule. "This is on the very reasonable theory that persons of ordinary intelligence, accustomed to associate in business and in
a social way with the person in question, are peculiarly qualified to judge
56. P. 341.
57. Pp. 369-370.
58. P. 372, n. 25.
59. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U. S. 612 (1884).
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of his mental competency."6 °
The author devotes 130 pages to the "hearsay" evidence rule and its
many exceptions."' After stating the rule generally and stressing that
these exclusionary rules are being relaxed in proceedings before quasijudicial bodies such as administrative agencies, pursuant to statutes creating those agencies, McKelvey differentiates between the generally known
"real" exceptions and the "apparent" exceptions to the rule. In the latter
instances, the "hearsay" is admitted because of its value as circumstantial evidence, as proof that the statement was made, rather than as proof
of its contents. Keeping that distinction clearly in mind helps to a better understanding of the cases. The "real" exceptions are then discussed
in detail and include the usual matters of pedigree, the shop-book rule,
declarations in the regular course of business, declarations against interest, dying declarations, matters of general or public interest, public
documents, ancient documents, the "res gestae" rule, declarations of
mental conditions and declarations of testators. The text throughout
this chapter is generously supplemented by copious footnotes, in which
the author cites not only many New York cases, but also those of other
American jurisdictions as well as early English common law cases and
rules. The discussion of each sub-heading is clear, complete and wellillustrated by cases. It should be observed that the early cases cited
should be read with the warning that later cases and statutes in particular jurisdictions may have brought about a different conclusion. Thus
the author's statement that "dying declarations are admissible only in
cases of homicide" 2 should not cause the student of New York or New
Jersey law to forget that in these states, dying declarations are also
admissible in "abortion" actions today, although not so in the early
cases.68 Again, the author's statement as to the admissibility generally
of "records of births, deaths, and marriages" 4 must be read by New
York students in the light of the New York cases63 and statutes,6 6 if
one is to apply New York law to a particular case.
The chapter on "witnesses" 67 comprehensively covers the subject matter, both from the viewpoint of "competency," as well as that of "privi601 P. 370.
61. Chap. 11, pp. 380-510.
62. P. 474.
63. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 398a; People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 (1874); State v.
Corson, 108 N. J. L. 12, 157 Atl. 103 (1931).
64. P. 492.
65. Beglin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 N. Y. 374, 66 N. E. 102 (1903); Thomas
v. Morris, 286 N. Y. 266, 36 N. E. (2d) 141 (1941).
66. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 372.
67. Chap. 12.
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lege." The statement that "at the present time there is no exclusion upon
the ground of religious belief, or the lack of it,"" is true generally, and
particularly so in New York,6" but is not true everywhere. Thus,
in New Jersey an atheist may testify as a "party" in his own
behalf, but not as a "witness" for another.7" Parties interested are no
longer disqualified. Nor today are persons incompetent as witnesses
because previously convicted of crime. However, the interest of the witness or his record of conviction may be used to affect credibility. The
competency of one spouse to testify for the other is generally recognized
today.71 However, vestiges of the common law disability are still retained, more or less, in varying degrees, in the different jurisdictions,
when it is a matter of one spouse testifying against the other 7 2 and
of course, the old rule prohibiting the disclosure of confidential communications between husband and wife is still retained. The author includes a discussion of the competency and privilege of infants, insane
persons, grand and petit jurors, judges, attorneys, physicians, clergymen and newspaper reporters. The rules of evidence are not uniform
throughout the United States. Thus physicians and clergymen are privileged in New York 73 but not so in New Jersey. 74 Reporters are protected
by statute in New Jersey against compulsory disclosure of the source
of their information," but not so in New York." So, one reading this
treatise on Evidence must constantly remember that it is a general textbook, expressing the majority viewpoint, generally, and while the author
tries valiantly to state contrary views of particular States, the limitation of space in one volume does not permit such development of the
subject matter. For example, in stating that a failure by the accused
to testify furnishes no ground for an inference against him,7 7 one must

be careful to compare the principle enunciated with the rule adopted in
the particular jurisdiction. He may find a variance.7
The matter of privilege against self-incrimination is well treated and
particularly one might read with profit the paragraph explaining that
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
N. J.
75.
76.
77.
78.

P. 514.
Brink v. Stratton, 176 N. Y. 150, 68 N. E. 148 (1903) ; N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 3.
Percey v. Powers, 51 N. J. L. 432, 17 Atl. 969 (1889).
P. 518.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 346 and 349; N. J. S. A. 2:97-4.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 351-352
State v. Morehous, 97 N. J. L. 285, 117 AtI. 296 (1922); Bahrey v. Poniatishin, 95
L. 128, 112 AtI. 481 (1920).
N. J. S. A. 2:97-11.
In re Mooney, 269 N. Y. 291, 199 N. E. 415 (1936).
P. 534.
State v. Gimbel, 107 N. J. L. 235, 151 At. 756 (1930).
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"the privilege is limited to the jurisdiction in which it is claimed." 79 Do
not the new cases indicate a swing away from the protection of that
ancient constitutional guarantee? And is that tendency sound? One
might well reflect upon the author's statement, "The United States courts
hold that the privilege against self-incrimination is non-existent when
the answer would not tend to show commission of a federal crime by
the witness, even though it might tend to show commission of a state
offense."" o
The chapter dealing with the "Examination of Witnesses"8 " explains
the ordinary trial procedure, including both direct and cross-examination, as well as re-examination, and the limitations thereof. The use
of "leading questions," which suggest the answer, is generally objectionable on direct examination, except in the case of an ignorant or hostile
witness. But such questions are permitted on cioss-examination. The
well known prohibition against impeaching one's own witness is contrasted with methods for neutralizing surprise testimony. The use of a
memorandum to refresh the recollection of the forgetful, friendly witness
is compared with the use of a memorandum or previous statement as
a foundation for the neutralizing process. The text is not too clear on
the extent to which contradictory statements of a witness who is not a
party to the action may be used against him. 2 Perhaps the Jaw itself
in the several jurisdictions is not too clear or harmonious on the point,
since some states adopt a broad view" and others limit the contradictory
statements to that which was subscribed or sworn.8 4 The author might
also have developed a little more fully the extent to which cross-examination may be used, in asking a hostile witness about acts of criminality
or immorality of his past life, where the acts are not supported by a
criminal record. And should not the rule to the effect that the answers
of the witness to such questions are binding upon the examiner, if
the matters inquired into are collateral to the issue, be set forth?
The "best evidence" rule and the "parol evidence" rule each with
their numerous exceptions are ably treated in the chapter on "Writings."8 5 However, it does not seem proper to include in this chapter on
79. P. 542.
80. P. 543; U. S. v. St. Pierre, 128 F.(2d) 979 (C. C. A. 2d 1942); Feldman v. U. S.
322 U. S. 487 (1944).
81. Chap. 13.
82. P. 577.
83. State v. Bien, 95 N. J. L. 474, 113 Atl. 248 (1921) ; Lenz v. P. S. Ry Co., 98
N. J. L. 849, 121 Atl. 741 (1923).
84. People v. De Martini, 213 N. Y. 203, 107 N. E. 501 (1914); N. Y. CiV. PRAC. ACT
§343a.
85. Chap. 14.
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writings a discussion of the subject of "real" or "demonstrative" evidence. There seems but very slight relationship between the two. A consideration of "real" evidence might more properly be. included in a
chapter defining the various kinds of evidence. Yet both subjects are
amply covered in this particular chapter. The illustrations of the use of
real evidence are very vivid and not likely to be forgotten. The bar of
such evidence when used to create sympathy is sensible.
In considering the best evidence ruk, does the author mean to imply
that the "minutes" of the meeting are not the best evidence of the
corporate proceedings?80 Many states regard them as the best evidence. 7 His statement as to this point is not clear. Likewise, clarity
might be improved in distinguishing between the use of a "notice to
produce" and a subpoena duces tecum. Is it not generally provided that
the former is served only upon a party and failure to comply allows the
.use of secondary evidence; whereas, the subpoena duces tecum is generally served upon a witness, not a party, but may also be served upon
a party, and failure to comply with it more severe penalties than the
mere possible use of secondary evidence?
The sections in the chapter concerned with handwriting 8 seem repetitious, and add nothing to similar treatment of the same subject matter
in the sections in the chapter dealing with opinion evidence8 9 in matters
of handwriting. True, repetition does not harm, but is it necessary in
the preparation of a single, compact volume?
Again, the inclusion in this chapter on writings of the matter of
"proof of relationship by resemblance" seems inadvisable. The author's
generalization that courts have quite generally allowed "the placing
of the child and the alleged father before the jury, and allowing them
to draw their own inferences as to resemblance," 90 is very questionable.
Is it not rather the safer, sounder view that mere resemblance is not
admissible.proof of relationship? 91 The author might also have discussed
the modern trend toward the use of blood-grouping tests, in cases of
disputed relationship, because of their value, not affirmatively to establish relationship, but rather negatively to dispute it.
The New York student should be reminded that McKelvey's statement, "the official registration of a motor vehicle pursuant to statute
does not establish its ownership, and parol evidence is admissible to
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
1913).

P. 610.
Robson v. Fenniman, 83 N. J. L. 453, 85 At. 356 (1912).
Chap. 14, p. 629.
Chap. 10, p. 376.
P. 637.
Bilkovic v. Loeb, 156 App. Div. 719, 723, 141 N. Y. Supp. 279, 281 (1st Dept.
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show the real owner, ' 92 should be read in the light of existing New York
law, and particularly the rule which estops a person, who causes an
automobile to be registered in his name, from claiming after an accident
that he was not the real owner.9 3
The many exceptions to the "parol evidence" rule are simply handled,
and the author includes examples of fraud, mistake, incorrect date, conditional delivery, lack or failure of considerations, collateral agreements,
customs, technical words, substitutions and latent ambiguity to stress
the more important exceptions.9 4 The distinction between "latent" and
"patent" ambiguity is not pointed out, and the use of parol evidence in
the former but not in the latter type of ambiguity ought to be set down
with simple illustrations.
As previously noted, an innovation in this fifth edition is the separate
chapter on "pictorial evidence." 9 5 The use of photographs, maps, diagrams, motion pictures, aerial pictures and x-rays is becoming so common in the trial of the modern action that separate treatment of the
subject matter is desirable. And the author does treat it ably, clearly
and quite completely. His distinction between the use of pictorial evidence as "illustrative" of testimony given by the witness and its use
as a "witness," in "bringing the view to the court" aids in a better
understanding of this particular subject matter. The value of photographs, as a practical substitute for the ancient "view by the jury" is
made manifest. Stress is properly placed upon the requirements that
the photograph must be a "correct representation of the scene at
the time," and that "identity" must be clearly established, particularly
in the use of the X-ray picture. The use of motion pictures and pictures in natural colors, when these same two requirements are met,'is
advocated as a step in the right direction. The New York case of Feeney
v. Young,9 6 an action for libel, involving portrayal of plaintiff in a motion picture, in which the plaintiff offered to show the picture to the
jury, and upon defendant's objection it was excluded on the ground
that the testimony of one who had seen the picture and identified the
plaintiff was the best evidence and that the film as secondary evidence
was inadmissible, is severely and justly criticized.
Of course, pictorial evidence is open to contradiction, and "photographs may be shown to be inaccurate, distorted or otherwise unreli92. P. 639.
93. Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915) ; N. Y. VEMICLE & TRAZsc
Law § 59; Shuba v. Greendonner, 271 N. Y. 189, 193, 2 N. E. (2d) 536 (1936).

94.
95.
96.

Pp. 644 et seq.
Chap. 15.
191 App. Div. 501, 181 N. Y. Supp. 481 (1st Dept. 1920).
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able."10 7 Similarly, where used to arouse unfairly the sympathy of the
jury, exclusion of photographs is proper. Like so-called "posed" pictures, "each case must be treated on its own facts and the likelihood
of assisting or misleading the ,jury should govern the admission of the
photographs.""8
The final chapter"0 discusses the matter of demurrers to evidence.
This ancient practice has long since gone out of use in New York and
generally so in other jurisdictions. Its inclusion in this new edition is
justified by the author on the basis that "an understanding of the original
device is desirable for the student and practitioner as an aid to an intelligent use of the methods which succeeded it."' And again, "in the
study of the law, that which is obsolete cannot always, and perhaps
should not ever, be ignored."'10 The chapter lends comprehensiveness
to the treatment of the law of evidence.
This single, compact volume will prove of much help to the student
of the law and will be of great value to the practitioner. The work is
well done. It is the crowning achievement of a life well .spent in helping
thousands of law students to understand better the rules and principles
of the Law of Evidence.
97. P. 705.
98. P. 700.
99. Chap. 16.

100. P. 715.
101.

P. 716.
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